

M0110.62/41

~~11297/41~~
~~27/1/41~~
~~final~~
MOST SECRET

(Revised—June, 1933.)

FROM WHOM

C in C South Atlantic
786/020

DATE

21-6-41

MARKINGS TO BOARD.

61

SUBJECT.

Operation SALVAGE

2nd Sea Lord

1st Lord

35.

85a-2.

W.H. Case 7835.

52 Germany.

15-T.

Operation "Salvage"

Capture of German M.V. "Lochringen" 15/6/41

R: of P.

Awards.

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this

other

1941.



from RO 20/7/42
WS/TS 2
20 23/7/42
546 NL (in Sudhorn)



RECORD OFFICE

W Case 7835

2/12/41 (8) 52. Germany
R18
15.1.

A.C. 100

Most Secret

M Branch (Mr MC Carthy)

This was seen by DOD(F) and AENS(F) on entry.

Controller is interested in this vessel.

CW (Mr Sleadow) will wish to see
Earle's E.0949 of 16/6/51 paras 12-14;
and Dunedin's 00111 of 19/6/51 para
5.

~~Will you please circulate in the~~

~~form~~
Will you please give a limited
circulation as possible, in a
"Most Secret" document?

Crutchfield
110 12/12/51

Register No. M011062/41

Minute Sheet No.

The Honours and Awards Committee have carefully considered the claims to recognition of Officers and Men of H.M.S. DUNEDIN and EAGLE for good services in capturing the German Tanker LOTHRINGEN on 15th June, 1941, and submit the following Appointment and Awards as appropriate:-

Officer of the Order of the British Empire (Military)

- ✓ Captain R.S. Lovatt, H.M.S. Dunedin

Mention in Despatches

- ✓ Lieutenant-Commander R.M.H. Sowdon, R.N.,
H.M.S. Dunedin
- ✓ Sub-Lieutenant A() Charles R. Camidge, R.N.,
H.M.S. Eagle
- ✓ T/Sub-Lieutenant (A) Philip A. Denington, R.N.V.R.,
H.M.S. Eagle
- ✓ Telegraphist Percy T. Jackson, P/J.102244,
H.M.S. Dunedin

R. Gleadowe

(R. GLEADOWE)
SECRETARY, HONOURS AND AWARDS COMMITTEE
30th July, 1941

Concur
MW
2
8

APPROVED BY
H.M. THE KING
M. H. Hardy

APPROVED BY THE FIRST LORD

Am. P. C.
NAVAL SECRETARY TO
THE FIRST LORD.

11. 8. 41

*Supplement to London Gazette No 35248
19. 8. 41*

*Awards passed separately to NA 25L
CW(523)
ACR
DPS
N
for notation in records
J.P. Brook
for Sec Hr A C
23. 8. 41*

MOST SECRET

H.M.S. "DUNEDIN"

1941 June 1941

M O S T S E C R E T.

Subject. Operation "Salvage".

From THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, SOUTH ATLANTIC.

Date 21st. June, 1941.

No. 786/020.

To The Secretary of the Admiralty.



With reference to Admiralty's signal timed I556 B of 19th. June, the following documents are forwarded for the information of Their Lordships:-

- (i). H.M.S. Dunedin's letter No. 00I9I of 19th. June and seven Appendices.
- (ii). H.M.S. Dunedin's letter No. 00III of 19th. June and five enclosures.
- (iii). H.M.S. Eagle's letter No. E. 0949 of 16th. June and two Appendices.

M. W. Karlus

Vice Admiral
Commander in Chief.

09

MOST SECRET

No. 00191.

H.M.S. "DUNEDIN"

19th June 1941

INTERCEPTION AND CAPTURE OF THE GERMAN
M.V. "LOTHRINGEN"

Appendices

1. Intelligence report
2. Boarding Officer's report
3. Boarding Engineer Officer's report
4. Torpedo Officer's report
5. Nominal list of prisoners, and men left in the prize.
6. Medical Officer's report on wounded
7. Nominal List of "DUNEDIN's" prize crew.

All times are Zone plus one

Sir,

In accordance with instructions received from the Commanding Officer H.M.S. "EAGLE", I have the honour to submit the following report of the part taken by H.M.S. "DUNEDIN" in the capture of a German tanker and supply ship the M.V. "LOTHRINGEN", by Force 'F' (H.M. Ships "EAGLE" and "DUNEDIN") on 15th June 1941.

2.- At 1347 on 15th June 1941, when proceeding in company with "EAGLE" in position 18°35'N 37°43'W, orders were received from the Senior Officer Force 'F' to investigate a 'suspicious' tanker in a position 19°57'N 38°38'W steering 150°. Course was set forthwith 325° at best speed 24 knots ("DUNEDIN" has one boiler awaiting repair which is blanked off).

3.- During the approach to this position the following signals from "EAGLE's" aircraft were intercepted :-

IMMEDIATE. TO Aircraft FROM Aircraft
My 1237. OECS 270 - 10. Have attacked Merchant vessel with
dive bombing near miss. = 1350

IMMEDIATE TO "EAGLE" FROM Aircraft
1 MV 090 - 1 - N11 - 322 SRFU 128 R 08. Tanker believed
scuttling. = 1415

IMMEDIATE TO Aircraft FROM Aircraft
My 1415. Tanker German. = 1450

IMMEDIATE TO Duty X FROM Duty T
Position of enemy is 325 TKLP 45. Stopped. White Flag. = 1509

IMMEDIATE TO Duty Q FROM Duty T
One boat riddled ship stopped sinking. Am waiting. = 1526

IMMEDIATE TO Duty Q FROM Duty T
My 1526. Am still in touch with enemy. No change in the
situation. = 1557.

4.- An aircraft closed "DUNEDIN" at 1620, reporting the tanker to be 30 miles distant bearing 336 degrees. I asked if her crew had abandoned her, the aircraft replying in the negative.

5.- The tanker was...

d.


INTERCEPTION AND CAPTURE OF GERMAN M.V. "LOTHRINGEN"
 ("DUNEDIN's" letter No. 00191 of 19th June 1941)

5.- The tanker was sighted hull down at 1705 with three aircraft in her vicinity. As "DUNEDIN" closed her (from astern) one of these reported her as stopped and leaking and that she mounted two 3-inch guns and three machine guns. At 1725 the ship's company was piped to Action Stations, all guns being loaded and trained on the enemy.

At 1730, I hoisted the signal WBA International at both yard arms (Stop. Do not lower boats. Do not use radio. Do not scuttle. If you disobey, I open fire.)

At 1735, I ordered all aircraft to keep a good lookout for submarines.

At 1743, packages were being jettisoned by the enemy.



"DUNEDIN's" approach course
 speed 24 knots.

6.- "DUNEDIN's" cutter being hoisted on her port side, I approached the tanker as shown in the above diagram at 24 knots, releasing two depth charges - set to 350 feet - in the positions marked *, as a precaution against U-boats. This appeared to cause the enemy some consternation.

At 1750, a signal was flashed from the tanker which was read in "DUNEDIN" as "I understand" (It has since been established however that she intended to signal "I do not understand" in answer to "DUNEDIN's" "WBA International" of the introduction of which she had not been acquainted).

7.- The tanker was lying stopped with a marked list to port, a large area of the surrounding sea being covered with oil fuel. She was flying two white flags, one at each fore yard arm. A large motor boat had been lowered and was secured alongside her port side amidships. A group of men wearing German Naval uniform was observed fallen in on the Upper Deck.

8.- "DUNEDIN" was stopped.

INTERCEPTION AND CAPTURE OF GERMAN M.V. "LOTHRINGEN"
 ("DUNEDIN's" letter No.00191 of 19th June 1941)

- 8.- "DUNEDIN" was stopped on the tanker's port bow in the position shown in the diagram at about one cable's distance, the cutter containing the boarding and anti-scuttling party being slipped at 1752. The boarding boat reached the tanker with commendable rapidity, the boarding evolution being completed by 1756. ("DUNEDIN" was "kept moving" from 1754).
- 9.- The boarding party met with no opposition. The reports of the Boarding Officer (Lieutenant-Commander R.M.H.SOWDON) and of the Boarding Engineer Officer (Lieutenant-Commander (E) A.W.HUGHES D.S.C.) are attached, as Appendices 2 and 3.
- 10.- At 1820 all aircraft had left the scene with messages for "EAGLE" as to the situation.
- 11.- The Boarding Officer soon reported by V/S that there were 81 ratings onboard, that the ship had been hit by two bombs which had holed two tanks, but that no attempt had been made to scuttle her. At 1825 he requested more armed men be sent, stating his intention of sending over a boat-load of prisoners, including wounded. The tanker's motor boat was used for this, arriving alongside "DUNEDIN" at 1935 with the German doctor and 4 wounded. (This boat was used as a ferry throughout and proved invaluable, "DUNEDIN" having no suitable power boat available).
- 12.- All the wounded were found to be suffering from slight bomb or machine gun splinter wounds. "DUNEDIN's" Medical Officer's report is attached as Appendix 6.
- 13.- At this stage it was learned from the prisoners that the ship was the German "LOTHRINGEN", late Dutch "PAPENDRECHTE (11,000 tons), five weeks out of La Pallice. She had been building at Rotterdam when the Germans entered Holland, when she was seized and re-named.
- 14.- At 1842 a report was received from the Boarding Officer that the ship's engines and steering were correct, asking for a prize crew to be sent; but at 1847 he reported there were time bombs forward and requested the assistance of a torpedo party. In this connection, it appears that on being interrogated by the boarding officers, LOTHRINGEN's Chief Officer and Chief Engineer had pointed out the positions of six scuttling charges, but none of these had been set to explode as far as is known. "DUNEDIN's" Torpedo Officer (Mr. H. LOWEY, Commissioned Gunner (T)) and John A. MANNERS, C.P.O. (TGM), H/J.107405 removed these charges which are now onboard "DUNEDIN". The Torpedo Officer's report is attached as Appendix 4.
- 15.- At 1941, LOTHRINGEN reported all pumps in order, and that the damaged tanks were being pumped out.
- 16.- At 1945, "EAGLE" was in sight, after which she was kept informed of the state of affairs by signals in the form of a running commentary.

At 2000, LOTHRINGEN.....

INTERCEPTION AND CAPTURE OF GERMAN M.V. "LOTHRINGEN"
("DUNEDIN's" letter No. 00191 of 19th June 1941)

17.- At 2000, LOTHRINGEN was reported ready to proceed. A prize crew was placed onboard her under the command of Lieutenant R.S. BEVERIDGE R.N. by 2200 using the tanker's motor boat, and all German Naval personnel were transferred to "DUNEDIN". Of the tanker's crew, 4 officers and 3 ratings, namely the Chief Officer and 8 seamen, 2 cooks, the pumpman, storekeeper, electrician and all the Engine Room personnel except the Chief Engineer were left in the prize to help work the ship, for which they volunteered. (This number was erroneously reported to "EAGLE" in my 2355/15 as 4 officers and 14 ratings).

18.- On "EAGLE's" arrival I had obtained the Senior Officer Force F's concurrence to my proposal to send the ship to Bermuda, the choice of which offered the advantages of providing docking facilities, less chance of enemy attack on passage, and the probability that fine weather would be encountered. (The only disadvantage seemed to be the inevitable prolonged absence of the prize crew from H.M.S. "DUNEDIN", which I decided must be accepted). Consequently, on receiving favourable verbal reports from the Boarding Officer and Boarding Engineer Officer as to the seaworthiness of LOTHRINGEN, I decided to order her to proceed direct to Bermuda unescorted, but to remain in company with her myself for the first three hours of her passage.

19.- Some delay was then caused by the difficulties of boatwork and hoisting LOTHRINGEN's motor boat in the dark, but at 2345 she proceeded on a course 317 degrees, with "DUNEDIN" in company and "EAGLE" following, speed being quickly worked up to about 11½ - 12 knots.

20.- LOTHRINGEN was supplied for the passage with "DUNEDIN's" type 53 portable wireless set, as her own W/T had been demolished by the Germans before the boarding party arrived. She was instructed to keep watch on 4740 kc/s at single operator periods, was allocated "DUNEDIN's" Mercantile Secret Call Sign VP2CO, and was supplied with S.P's 2310, 2311, and 02272(13). She was also given navigational instructions and a copy of message QJB.26.

21.- At 0121 on 16th June, LOTHRINGEN reported she was able to proceed alone, whereupon Force 'F' parted company and set course 118 degrees for Freetown.

22.- No trouble of any sort was experienced with the prisoners, who were treated in accordance with A.F.O.2306/40 and C.A.F.O.2/41.

23.- LOTHRINGEN's estimated time of arrival at Bermuda is A.M. Sunday 22nd June 1941.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

CAPTAIN



The Commander-in-Chief,
South Atlantic
(Copy to the Senior Officer,
Force 'F', H.M.S. "EAGLE")

MOST SECRET

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

(Appendix No.1 to "DUNSDIN's" letter No.00191 of 19th June 1941)

The following intelligence report is compiled from evidence supplied by inspection of documents and personal effects of prisoners, voluntary statements made by members of the crew and conversations, either with personnel of "DUNSDIN" or overheard amongst themselves. No formal questioning was held.

I. CONFIRMED INTELLIGENCE.

1. The ship was the German tanker LOTHRINGEN, formerly the Dutch PAPENDRECHT. She was building at Rotterdam when the Germans entered Holland, and was seized. She was commissioned with a German crew on 23rd January 1941 and left Rotterdam on 4th March 1941. She proceeded down channel, calling at Cherbourg, Brest and St. Nazaire en route for La Pallice. She left La Pallice on 11th May 1941 and had been at sea since then.

2. She was under the management of ERSTE DEUTSCHE WALFANG G.m.b.h. of Hamburg.

3. The complement was divided into two separate parts, composed firstly of merchant navy officers and men who were responsible for the running of the ship, and who were appointed by the Erste Deutsche Walfang. They are known as Deutsche Wehrmacht, on the lines of British T.124 agreement; secondly, the Naval members who were not responsible in any way for running the ship except a). to man the A.A. armament, b). to supervise W/T, and c). as Torpedo Party. They were under the command of Stabstfeldwebel RUCH and Feuerwerker WESCHE.

4. The ship was undoubtedly a supply ship and carried 1000 tons of diesel oil for submarines and 11,000 tons of fuel oil for surface craft. She also carried 32 torpedoes and special food and comforts. Her armament consisted of A.A. guns only.

5. The crew appeared to be well fed, although many members of the crew stated they did not receive the special foods (such as turkey and chocolate) which was being kept, presumably for U-boats or raiders. All members of the crew had been issued with Vitamin 'C' tablets.

6. All money, food, tobacco and washing apparatus appeared to be either French or Dutch, and many of them had new clothes of the same origin.

II. INTELLIGENCE CONSIDERED RELIABLE

The Captain stated that the reason the ship was not scuttled was that "EAGLE's" aircraft machine gunned the decks if anyone appeared on them. This also explains the fact that her guns were not demolished. The Chief Engineer, he said, refused to damage the engines and in view of the fact that a tanker has no under cover communication fore and aft, he was the only one who could do anything. The naval ratings, however, appeared angry that the Captain did not scuttle ship and state that owing to the bombing and the machine gunning of boats he lost his head and appeared to think that he and his crew would be left to their fate.

The naval members.....

(Appendix No.1 to "DUNEDIN's" letter No.00191 of 19th June 1941)

II. INTELLIGENCE CONSIDERED RELIABLE (continued)

The naval members of the crew tried to persuade him to fire the scuttling charges when "DUNEDIN" was sighted, but he refused to do so, saying that they had something under their feet and it would be better to keep it there than take any risk. The Chief Engineer (BRAMMANN), when asked why he had not damaged the engines stated that if he had done so, we would have made him work night and day to repair them. Lack of determination to destroy the ship confirms the statement made below that the merchant navy officers and crew did not have their heart in their job. It is significant that the naval party placed discipline before initiative in that they obeyed the order of the Captain of the ship, and made no attempt themselves to scuttle. Whatever the real reason for not scuttling, it is certain that the work of the aircraft was decisive in demoralising the crew. The various members of the crew are obviously trying to blame each other for their own failure.

2. All members of the crew denied having supplied any ship or U-boat before being intercepted. This is borne out by the fact that the ship was full up with oil. All members of the crew had obviously been cautioned against giving away any information about U-boats or other raiders, and were very much on their guard in consequence. Chief Engineer BRAMMANN, however, stated that they had a rendezvous with a U-boat on 17th June, though he did not know the position. This is confirmed by remarks made by Funker Gefreiter AUF DER MAUER and Bootsmaat WINKLER.

3. One member of the crew stated that U-boats work in 2 watches of 6 hours each..

4. The naval party consisted of only a few experienced submarine ratings (one or two had Iron Crosses) the remainder being young and only just through training. Sig.Gefreiter GRAF stated that they were not a spare U-boat crew and this appears to be true although they could obviously be used as a pool if necessary..

5. Funkmaat WEISSEHORN, one of the W/T operators, stated that two W/T messages were made to a German station on interception, reporting a). Danger, and b). Bombing. He would not state the frequency used, except that it was not 500 kc/s.

6. An order was found instructing all German ships operating in the North Sea to have swastikas painted on deck and covered up, in order to identify themselves to German aircraft.

7. The Captain and crew state that the manning of the ship by merchant marine and naval personnel was experimental, being the first time this has been done in the case of a supply ship. The Naval ratings pronounce the experiment a failure.

III. GENERAL OPINIONS

All the merchant navy and the older naval ratings appeared to be thankful to be out of the war, and had no illusions as to the risks they were taking, the general opinion being that they had about one chance in ten of returning safely. The younger naval ratings, however, appeared to believe they could sweep the seas of British ships with the maximum of glory and a minimum of danger.

They were surprised...

(Appendix No. 1 to "DUNEDIN's" letter No. 00191 of 19th June 1941)

III. GENERAL OPINIONS (Continued)

They were surprised to see a British aircraft as they had been told before leaving that we no longer had any aircraft carriers in service, and that our most modern cruisers were no longer of any use. They had, however, been informed of the loss of the "BISMARCK".

2. From information available, it appears likely that either Stabtsfeldwebel RUCH or Funkmaat Karl BECKER was the "Political Leader" on board.

3. The general opinion of damage done by British bombing raids is that damage at Brest and Hanover is particularly bad, and that at Hamburg very bad in the dock area, although the town does not appear to have been damaged to any extent.

4. Comments on the Rudolf HESS affair show that they were obviously bewildered, but none of them believed that he was either mad or a traitor and most of them tried to get out of their dilemma by suggesting that he was an idealist, trying to stop the war. The Captain qualified this ~~statement~~ with a statement that he did not consider that Hess really knew the inner secrets of the party, and thought he was trying to gain publicity.

5. They held a very low opinion of Italy and the Italians in general and considered that Mussolini had let Germany down worse than France let us down.

6. They had been told and were convinced that the French fleet will eventually fight against England.

7. Nearly all the crew are convinced that the war will end in favour of Germany before the end of this summer. When asked what would happen if this did not occur they said that things would be very bad for Germany.

8. Dr. SCHIECKEL stated that he recently saw a British submarine in Kiel which he thought was the "SWORDFISH" and which was being used by the German Navy.

IV. NOTES ON INDIVIDUALS

(1) Kapitan Max FRIEDRICHSEN. Age 61. This was to have been his last trip. He has relations in England (sister-in-law), living in London; is not a party man; is a Freemason and therefore could not be a member of the Nazi Party, even if he wished. Appears to be content he no longer has to fight. Speaks English, and served with the Eagle Oil Co. of Farley, Rants for some years and also the Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, U.S.A.

(2) Erst Ingenieur Johannes BRAMMANN. Age 58. Appears to have been forced into this job against his will. Very pleased to be out of the war and talks more than any other prisoner.

(3) Bootsmaat Fritz WINKLER. Speaks fluent English. Was very helpful as a go-between, but will not talk about U-boats etc. Served in a 'Castle' boat.

(4) Funkmaat Karl BECKER.....

(Appendix No.1 to "DUNEDIN's" Letter No.00191 of 19th June 1941)

IV. NOTES ON INDIVIDUALS (Continued)

(4) Funkmaat Karl BECKER. An ardent Nazi who cannot speak any English. He is an experienced U-boat W/T operator and has an Iron Cross as well as a badge denoting that he has served in a U-boat which has been attacked with depth charges. He has made it his business to prevent the crew from saying anything about U-boats and appears to be somewhat unpopular amongst them. As already stated, he may be the Political Leader of the ship and owing to his influence over the crew it is suggested that he should be separated from them when landed.

(5) Funkmaat Helmuth WEISSENBORN. A reservist who is a dentist by profession. Speaks fluent English and will talk on most subjects except U-boats and W/T. Appears not to agree with Nazi politics but is unlikely to be the type of man who would implement his opinions with deeds.

(6) Signal Gefreiter Franz GRAF. A reservist who is very pleased to be out of the war. Is very friendly, speaks a little English and may prove useful for the purpose of questioning.

(7) Matrose Gefreiter Robert KAISER. This man served in the raider "MOVE" during the last war. He is a rating of the old Imperial Navy, used to strict discipline and without any of the characteristics of the Nazi-trained sailors.

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Appendix 2, to "DUNEDIN'S" letter No. 00191 of 19th June 1941.

BOARDING OFFICERS' REPORT.

Sir,

I have the honour to submit the following report of the boarding of the German Ship "LOTHRINGEN".

The surprisingly easy capture of the ship seems to be mainly due to the age of the Captain (61) and Chief Engineer (54) and that characteristic of German discipline which makes men quite content to obey orders, and when no orders are given to do nothing.

On getting alongside with the boarding boat I found a rope ladder had been put over and the ship's motor life boat secured alongside just aft of it. Two white flags flew at the foremast.

As I got on-board I found the crew were gathered in two groups, one near the sea gangway and one on the fore and aft bridge. All were inactive except that I was given a helping hand over the guard rails.

The Senior Engineer with E.R.A. Hicks and Marine sentry went aft to the Engine Room. Sub-Lieut. Hollinshead went straight to the bridge. Guards were placed on the bridge, officers' quarters, crew space and on the men assembled on deck. I then went to the bridge where I found the Captain and told him I had come to take his ship. All he said was "All right then; she has been bombed". He then showed me the bomb holes above No's. 2 Port and 3 Starboard tanks.

An inspection of the upper deck showed - both life boats damaged by bullets or small splinters (one of the near misses was aft near one of the boats wounding some men slightly.) The life boats were full of men's gear as for Abandon Ship and the port boat had been lowered a few feet. Three light A.A. weapons, about 1 pounders, had each a clip of cartridges in place with a full supply of ammunition to hand and one of them had about 40 empty cases in the net. These may have been used against our aircraft. The wireless office had been wrecked and none of the usual ship's papers could be found. The ship had a list to port.

The Chief Officer, who is in charge of all tanks and cargo spaces, showed Lt. Cdr. (E) Hughes the damage and also said there were six demolition charges in position but they were quite safe. He also said they had 36 torpedoes on-board but, as these were under a heavy hatch they were not sighted.

I decided to get rid of the wounded and all who appeared to be naval ratings, and to ask for an anti-demolition party. I detailed the second officer to run their motor boat which he was quite willing to do obeying all orders cheerfully, and two boat loads were sent over to "DUNEDIN".

On the arrival of Mr. Lowey, Cd. Gnr. (T) with the T.G.M., they were shown the position of the demolition charges and removed them. Owing to the dark in the forepeak the Bickford's type safety fuze of one charge was accidentally set off, probably caused by the friction device at the end of the fuze being lashed up in a convenient place, so that the pull on it as the charge was being

Appendix 2, (Continued).

removed set it off. Mr. Lowey however cut the burning fuze and so rendered it safe. Two of the demolition charges in the pumping compartment appeared to have an extra device on them which may have been a clockwork fuze. These were thrown over-board without delay so that I have not many details.

The Senior Engineer reported that the engine room and all machinery were correct and that the ship was being got upright, the ship's pumpman being most willing, again an older man. Shipwright Gray reported wells dry so I asked for the prize crew to be sent. I would like to commend the speed with which Lt. Cdr. Hughes grasped the situation and got the necessary pumps into operation.

Sub-Lieut. Hollinshead searched the bridge, cabins and living quarters and the forepeak but found little in the way of papers and that no efforts had been made to scuttle the ship. It is assumed that the scuttling charges are normally kept in place.

The whole attitude of the Captain seemed to ^{be} that having insufficient sea-worthy boats for all his crew, he hoisted the white flag to ensure their safety and was willing to hand over the ship as far as possible intact; and knowing that this act would mean death for him if he got back to Germany he preferred to ensure as far as possible that his crew and himself should arrive in safety at a British port.

The ship had been got upright when I left her under the command of Lieutenant Beveridge, the Prize Officer.

The following comments are submitted:-

It seems that the older men in German ships will probably be of help and will assist when treated reasonably. It is only the younger ones who want to be heroes for Hitler. At the same time I feel it essential to show you mean business directly you get on-board, and one cannot expect other captures to be so simple.

A bomb hit in the oil tanks of a tanker does little to sink the ship as long as the bulkheads to the forepeak, pump room and engine room are intact since these three main compartments supply all buoyancy of the ship. A hole in a tank only means that the oil there leaks out and gets replaced by water. This may cause a list which is disconcerting to young in-experienced men. Some of the younger German Naval men seemed to presume the ship was sinking. It follows that the three main compartments mentioned are the obvious ones in which to look for scuttling charges and also that there is little hope of saving the ship once scuttling has been decided upon. Hoisting the boats as done by EAGLE'S aircraft is obviously the best deterrent since it leaves the crew with only the ship itself in which to keep afloat and alive.

There was a large supply of red rubber oiling hoses on deck (about 6") and a 6½ wire, presumably for towing while oiling. A large deck tackle attached may have been used as a spring.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

(R.M.H. Sowdon) Lt. Cdr.

Appendix 3. to "DUNEDIN'S" letter No. 00191 of 19th June 1941.

ANTI-SQUITTING REPORT.

Sir,

I have the honour to forward the following report on the boarding of the German supply ship "LOTHRINGEN".

Lt. Comdr. Sowden boarded the ship first followed by myself and E.R.A. Hicks. The ship had about eight degrees list to Port. E.R.A. Hicks and myself proceeded to the engine room, and a cursory search showed the engine room to be intact, engines not damaged, and enough starting air in reservoirs to enable the ship to proceed immediately if the damage to the hull caused by the bombing was not too severe. Steam was raised in the donkey boiler. The Second Engineer, one engineers' assistant, and one fireman were on watch in engine room. I ordered them to remain on watch and left E.R.A. Hicks and E.R.A. Patterson on guard in the engine room and also placed a Royal Marine sentry on guard at the engine room entrance.

I then went on deck in search of the Chief Engineer and found him in his cabin. He assured me that the engines were in perfect condition and also that the steering gear had in no way been damaged. He told me the state of the bunkers and fresh water tanks, viz: 935 tons of Diesel oil and 650 tons of fresh water. The 935 tons of Diesel oil included No. 7. cargo tanks which were reserve bunker tanks.

All drawings and information books were intact in the Chief Engineer's Office except the engine room register, which could not be found. I locked up the office and sleeping quarters of the Chief Engineer and ordered him to muster the engine room crew on the upper deck, and he accompanied me in the search of the crew's quarters. After mustering the crew of fifteen, I then reported to Lt. Comdr. Sowden the condition of the engine room and steering gear and informed him of my intention to find out the extent of the hull damage. The engine room crew including the Chief Engineer were then sent to their cabins aft and sentries were placed on guard.

Lt. Comdr. Sowden then placed the Chief Officer of the ship at my disposal, and I ordered him to sound all tanks with the aid of the pumpman. All tanks were nearly full except No's. 2 and 3. He told me No. 4 tank sounding had dropped a few tons. No. 2 Port tank and No. 3 Starboard tank each had one direct hit by bombs which had penetrated the deck and burst inside the tanks. I then entered the tanks as far as possible for inspection. The bomb had entered into No. 2 Port tank through the deck about ten feet from the Port side and I judged it had not burst until near the ship's bottom and intertank bulkheads. No. 2 tank was about half full. In No. 3 tank Starboard the bomb had pierced the deck about two feet from the Starboard side and had burst about three feet below the water line. The ship's side was bulged outward and owing to the list on the ship, oil could be seen spurting out of bulged seams when the ship rolled. I estimated that No's. 2 and 3 tanks and possibly No. 4 tank had damaged divisional bulkhead and would eventually level off. As all pumps were intact I judged the ship was in no danger and could proceed. To bring the ship upright I ordered E.R.A. Hicks and the pumpmen to put steam on the pumps and try to pump out No. 2 Port tank.



Appendix 3. (Continued).

Apparently water entered No.2 tank as fast as the pump could take it away, so the pumps were put on No.3 Port tank and the ship was soon brought upright.

A demolition charge was found clipped to each side of the engine room close to the sea inlet valves. These charges were eventually removed by the Gunner (T). No attempt had been made to scuttle the ship. Every assistance was given by the German Officers and crew when it was asked or ordered of them. The crew gave the impression that their part in the war would be finished. The engine room department appeared to be well stocked with stores, tools, and spare gear.

Sub.Lt.(E) David Hanson arrived onboard with two E.R.A.'s, one Stoker Petty Officer and Three Stokers as prize crew. It was arranged that the German engine room crew should remain on-board, except the Chief Engineer, to work the ship into port. The prize crew and German crew were set in three watches, and the German crew were confined under guard to the Port side of the crew's accommodation, which was aft, around the engine room.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

A.W. Hughes

(A.W. Hughes)
Lieutenant Comdr.(E).

MOST SECRET

TORPEDO OFFICER'S REPORT

(Appendix No.4 to "DUNEDIN's" letter No.00191 of 19th June 1941)

H.M.S. "DUNEDIN"

19th June 1941

Sir, I have the honour to submit the following report on the scuttling charges removed from the German Ship LOTHRINGEN.

2.- Six charges were found, secured in the following compartments :-

- 1 large charge each side of the Engine Room, bolted to the ship's side and fitted to fire by electricity or time fuse.
- 1 large charge each side in the bilges under the Pumping Room, secured by wedges in the corner and fitted to fire either as above or, in addition, by a mechanical device.
- 1 smaller charge, half of the above, in the bilges under the Fore Peak, secured in opposite corners by being lashed to the rib plates, fitted to fire by electricity or time fuse.

3.- All charges were brought back onboard except those fitted with the mechanical device, which were thrown overboard. The large charges were composed of six 9 $\frac{1}{2}$ lb. T.N.T. charges in metal containers, the smaller charges being three of the smaller charges being lashed together. All charges contain their own primers and are fitted to take mechanical, electrical or time fuse firing detonators.

4.- The detonators, with time fuses and electrical wiring complete were retained as items of interest and investigation.

5.- During the removal of the Fore Peak bilge charges in the dark, the time fuse of one of the charges was operated, but the charge was prevented from exploding by severing the fuse before its entry into the detonator, the fuse being fired by a small bead on a string in a container on the fuse length itself, period 7 to 8 $\frac{1}{2}$ minutes.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,



COMMISSIONED GUNNER (T)

The Commanding Officer,
H.M.S. "DUNEDIN"

Appendix to 5, to "Sunderland" Liberty
no. 10194, of 19th June 1941.

Officers and men of the German Merchant Navy remaining in
Prize "LOTHRINGEN".



Officers.

- 1st Officer Neumann.
- 2nd Engineer Caspar.
- 3rd Engineer Schoen.
- 3rd Engineer Hommola.

Men.

- Assistant Engineer Burbach.
- " " Kaminsky.
- Cook Porowsky.
- Cook's Mate Grage.
- Ordinary Seaman Kropp.
- Pumpman Zunkel.
- Storekeeper Bartels.
- Electrician Kraut.
- Able Seaman Six.
- " " Rheme.
- " " Cebulla.
- " " Loppe.
- " " Wollenweber.
- Leading Seaman. Szlatolaweck.
- Fireman Guetzow.
- " Krone.
- Stoker Nestmann.
- " Phillipkowsky.
- " Juergens.

Four Officers and nineteen men.

(Merchant Officers and Ratings)

Prisoners of War.

Appendix No. 5 to "Sumner's" letter,
No. 10191, of 19th June, 1941.

Record of Prisoners of War.

Taken by } H.M.S. "DUNEPIN" at On 15 June 1941.
Received in }

No. on Ship Bk.	Name	Nationality	Rank	Ship	Date received onboard.	Date, place, etc. of disposal	Whether wounded or since died,
	Max Friedrichsen	German	Master	"Lothringen"			
	Johann Kastner	German	2nd Officer	" " "			
	Gerd Janssen	German	2nd Officer	" " "			
	Kurt Genz	German	W/T Officer	" " "			
	Johannes Brammann	German	Chief Engineer	" " "			
	Ernst Klug	German	Steward	" " "			
	Johann Grundbichler	German	Seaman Boy	" " "			WOUNDED.
	Robert Oehlrichs	German	Boatswain	" " "			
	Wilhelm Mainz	German	Carpenter	" " "			
	Franz Walters Peters	German	Ordinary Seaman	" " "			
	Ernst Schultze	German	Able Seaman	" " "			
	Edward Merkel	German	Boy	" " "			
	Herbert Schilde	German	Cabin Boy	" " "			
	Richard Stransky	German	Fireman	" " "			WOUNDED.
	Fritz Thunicke	German	Able Seaman	" " "			WOUNDED.

Prisoners of War.

Record of Prisoners of War.

Taken by

H.M.S. "DUNEDIN"

at.....

June 1941.

Received in)

Appendix to 5. to "Landed" letter
no 00191, of 19 June 1941.

No on Sh. Bk.	Name.	Nationality	Rank	Ship.	Date received onboard	Date, place, etc. of disposal.	Whether Wounded or since died.
	Franz Huch	German	Feuerwerker	"Lothringen"			
	Hermann Tesche	German	Stabstarzt	" "			
	Hans Hermann Scaetzel	German		" "			
	Gerhard Kroitsch	German	Boon's Mate	"Lothringen"			
	Peter Neschen	German	" "	" "			
	Alfred Dekena	German	" "	" "			
	Fritz Winkler	German	" "	" "			
	Alfons Rehbein	German	MatroseHaupt Gefreiter,	" "			
	Heinz Burmeister	German	" "	" "			
	Josef Bree	German	Ober	" "			
	Albert Schurr	German	Mech. Ober Gefreiter	" "			
	Johannes Hofman	German	Matrose Gefreiter	" "			
	Heinz Vivell	German	" "	" "			
	Robert Kaiser	German	" "	" "			
	Heinz Brauer	German	" "	" "			
	Kurt Dittmann	German	" "	" "			
	Werner Becker	German	" "	" "			
	Josef Zettelmeier	German	" "	" "			
	Gerhard Morjan	German	" "	" "			
	Ewald Saur	German	" "	" "			
	Gottfried Zöchling	German	" "	" "			
	Richard Wolf	German	" "	" "			
	Andreas Jensen	German	Matrose	" "			
	Walter Reissmann	German	" "	" "			
	Karl Rose	German	" "	" "			
	Kurt Hermann	German	" "	" "			
	Menzel Hoffeldt	German	" "	" "			

List. 2. (Naval Ratings.)

Prisoners of War.

*Appendix no 5, to Semedins letter
No. 00191 of 19th June 1941*

No on Shp. Rk.	Name	Nationality	Rank	Ship	Date received onboard.	Date, place, etc. of disposal.	Whether wounded or since died.
	Gerhard Jessulat	German	Matrose	"Lothringen"			
	Karl Jobellius	German	"	"			WOUNDED.
	Alfred Marx	German	"	"			
	Bernhard Janzing	German	"	"			WOUNDED.
	Karl Huwald	German	"	"			
	Fritz Krause	German	Sanitat Gefreiter,	"			
	Emil Haag	German	Matrose 1V	"			
	Herbert Sabzock	German	"	"			
	Franz Graf	German	Sign. Gefreiter.	"			
	Friedrich Forster	German	Matrose 1V	"			
	Gregor Kley	German	Funker Gefreiter.	"			
	Ernst Vedder	German	"	"			
	Fritz auf der Mauer	German	"	"			
	Robert Stuckenbrock	German	"	"			
	Helmuth Weissenborn	German	Funkmaat	"			
	Karl Becker	German	"	"			
	Walther Rietschel	German	Mech. Gefreiter	"			
	Werner Dermund	German	Matrose Haupt- Gefreiter	"			

MOST SECRET

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT ON WOUNDED

(Appendix No. 6 to "DUNEDIN's" letter No. 00191 of 19th June 1941)

H.M.S. "DUNEDIN"

18th June 1941

Sir, I have the honour to submit the following report on the wounded prisoners ex German ship "LOTHRINGEN".

2.- There were five prisoners reported as wounded. The wounds were all caused by splinters, the points of entry being very small in every case.

3.- In two (Matrose Karl JOREKUS and Matrose Bernard JANZING) the wounds were trivial and did not require operative interference. In two others (Matrose Fritz TRUNICKE and Fireman Rickard STRANSKY) the fragments had penetrated to a considerable depth in the left wrist and left thigh respectively. In these cases, the track was laid open throughout its entire length, fragments recovered, damaged tissue excised and the wound closed again by primary suture.

4.- The remaining man, (Boatswain Ernst OELRICHS) had numerous abrasions on his legs and a pulsating haematoma in his left wrist to which a pad and firm bandage was applied at the time. The next morning it was laid open under chloroform anaesthesia and the two severed ends of the radial artery were ligatured off.

5.- Up to the present, progress is very satisfactory in every case.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,


H. J. Broadway

SURGEON LIEUTENANT R.N.V.R.

The Commanding Officer,

H.M.S. "DUNEDIN"

19



Appendix, No 7. to "DUNEDIN'S" letter No. 00191 of 19th June 1941.

Nominal list of "DUNEDIN'S" Prize Crew.

Officers.

Lieutenant R.S. Beveridge, R.N.
Sub-Lieutenant J.G. Hollinshead, R.N.R.
Sub-Lieutenant (E) D. Hanson, R.N.
Midshipman R.A.S. Pratt, R.N.R.

Ratings.

Edward Huggins, P.O. P/JX 130385.
John Knight Ldg. Sea. P/JX 132805.
Edward R. Talbot, A.B. P/JX 161371.
Desmond Gibbs, A.B. P/JX 158404.
Thomas Ball, Ord. Sea. P/JX 219337.
Richard Noakes, A.B. N.K.
Louis B. Hearne, Ord. Sea. P/JX ~~220330~~ 220330.
Albert Sherrick, A.B. P/JX 193268
Arthur V. Young, A.B. P/JX 160775.
Alex. P. Stewart, A.B. P/JX 156036.
James H. Burton, A.B. P/JX 169636.
Eustace R. Berry, A.B. P/JX 170044.
Stanley B. Laney, Ord. Sea. P/IX 220323.
Leslie Dyer, A.B. P/SSX 14439.
Reginald V. Ballard, A.B. P/J 105015.
James McCaigue, A.B. N.K.

Arthur J. Elliott, E.R.A. 4, P/MX 51751.
Albert H. Hicks, E.R.A. 2, 941 E/B. R.N.R.
Thomas J. Brunton, E.R.A. 4, P/MX 53657.
John H. Quinton, S.P.O. P/K 18229.
George Watkins, Stoker, P/KX 111171.
Robert McCahon, Stoker, N.K.
William Saunders, Stoker, P/KX 112606.

Frederick G. Shepherd, E.A. 5.
William J. Bray, Shpt. 4. P/MX 63860.
William E. Reeley, Ldg. Cook. P/MX 58124.
William E. Codd, S.B.A. P/X 7234, R.N.A.S.B.R.
Kenneth W. Shearer, Signalman, P/JX 157450.
William D. Smith, Telegraphist, G/JX 157072.

Corporal William A. Kemp, Po. X 1179. Royal Marines.
Marine E.H. Lloyd, Po. X 3588.
Marine A.H. Laurence, Po. X 3586.
Marine G.D. Cox, Po. X 3581.
Marine Francis Robins, Po. X 1924.
Marine William Allen, PO. X 3696.
Marine Ernest Fletcher, Po. X 3903.

ADM 199/809 *2/END***MOST SECRET**

No. 00111.

H.M.S. "DUNEDIN"

19th June 1941

SPECIAL REPORT ON SECRET DOCUMENTS OBTAINED
FROM GERMAN M.V. "LOTHRINGEN"

Enclosures

- I. W/T Cypher Log in Plain Language.
 II. Cyphered Versions of W/T signals sent by LOTHRINGEN
 III. List of Confidential Books held.
 IV. W/T cabinet log 500 kc/s, etc. (Not secret)
 V. "DUNEDIN's" signal 0704Z/17.6.41 to "EAGLE"

Sir, With reference to my letter No.00191 of 19th June 1941, I have the honour to submit that although, when boarded, the LOTHRINGEN had jettisoned her secret books, documents, etc. (including all log books, Engine Room Registers and everything which could have thrown light on her past or future movements), the secret documents named as Enclosures I - III of this letter had been overlooked by the Germans and were seized by "DUNEDIN's" boarding party.

2.- Enclosures II and III were found in the presence of the German W/T operator, who had previously stated that everything secret had been destroyed. He is understood to have been much chagrined at their discovery.

3.- Enclosure I, particularly when read in conjunction with Enclosure II, is evidently a find of the first importance. It is submitted for consideration therefore whether arrangements might not be made for these two documents to be flown to the United Kingdom without delay.

4.- The credit for their discovery is due to Percy T. JACKSON, Telegraphist R.F.R., P/J.102244 of H.M.S. DUNEDIN who returned to search the W/T office again after the German operator had left, finding Enclosure I which had slipped down behind a demolished radio-gramophone which was in the W/T office. He suggests the reason it was overlooked is that the German W/T operator, when destroying his W/T set and radio-gramophone with a sledge hammer, may have dislodged the book which presumably had previously been placed on top of the radio-gramophone.

5.- If Telegraphist Jackson's discovery proves to be as valuable as, on the face of it, it seems, I submit that he may receive the recognition considered appropriate to his action.

6.- A report (attached) on the finding of these documents was signalled to the Senior Officer Force 'F' by V/S in cypher prefixed AIDAC on 19th June.

7.- Enclosure No. IV, although not confidential, is also included in case it may provide W/T intelligence of value.

I have the honour to be,
 Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

R. P. [Signature]

CAPTAIN



The Commander-in-Chief,
 South Atlantic.
 (Copy to the Senior Officer Force 'F',
 H.M.S. "EAGLE", without enclosures).

Closure status: Open
S

ADM 199/809 210

SECRET

H.M.S. "EAGLE",
16th June, 1941.

No. E.0949.

CAPTURE OF GERMAN U-BOAT SUPPLY SHIP
"LOTHRINGEN" BY H.M. SHIPS "EAGLE" AND "DUNEDIN"
IN POSITION 19° 49' NORTH, 38° 30' WEST.
15TH JUNE, 1941.

ENCLOSURES.

Appendix I. Photographs. } (not to
Appendix II. Track chart. } "DUNEDIN").

All times are Zone +1.

Sir,

I have the honour to report the following circumstances attending the capture of the German S.S. "LOTHRINGEN" by H.M. Ships "EAGLE" and "DUNEDIN" (Force "F") under my command.

This report deals with the operation up to the time of H.M.S. "DUNEDIN"s contact with the vessel. The Commanding Officer has been ordered to forward to you a separate report concerning the boarding, capture and prize crew etc.

15th June,

2. At 0800, a 100% clearing search of the patrol area was flown off and returned at 1145.

At 1015, a continuous line patrol across the Northern end of the area was commenced, Force "F" being in the best position to intercept in daylight any vessel reported by this patrol.

At 1252, 15th June, when in position 18° 37' North, 37° 29' West, H.M.S. "EAGLE" received an alarm report of one merchant vessel from aircraft 5B, the first aircraft on this line patrol, followed a few minutes later by amplifying reports giving her course as 160° and description as a tanker.

On closing the tanker, aircraft 5B signalled the vessel to stop. As no notice was taken machine gun fire was opened ahead of the ship. This was promptly returned by accurate machine gun fire from the vessel, several hits being registered on the fuselage and main planes.

3. 5B then dive-bombed and scored 2 hits and machine-gunned with both guns.

The aircraft was armed with two 250lb S.A.P. bombs, as was each aircraft sent on the original search and subsequent line patrols.

This bomb load was selected in order to effect a suitable compromise between reasonable offensive power and maximum endurance for the aircraft.

4. After being hit the ship commenced to circle and to leave a thick oily wake.

At 1350, aircraft 5B, owing to shortage of petrol left the tanker and returned to the Carrier.

Commander-in-Chief,
South Atlantic Station.
Copy to The Commanding Officer,
H.M.S. "DUNEDIN".

5.

SECRET.

(Page 2 of "EAGLE"s No. E.0949 of 16 June, 1941).

5. Twenty minutes later aircraft 5K arrived on the scene and found the tanker steaming erratically, apparently damaged and leaking oil. She had two white flags flying at the foremast and a white sheet was being waved from the bridge.

6. Efforts were being made to lower a power boat. Machine gun fire was opened on this boat and it was promptly dropped into the water with only one man in it. 5K then proceeded to machine gun 2 pulling boats slung outboard one each side of the poop. No further attempts were made to lower boats.

After repeatedly asking the tanker for her nationality the latter eventually answered "German" by lamp.

5K was joined at 1500 by 3 other aircraft sent as a Striking Force and at 1608 left the scene and returned to the Carrier.

7. Meanwhile at 1335 H.M.S. "DUNEDIN" was ordered to proceed to the position of the tanker and at 1400 a Striking Force of 3 aircraft armed each with four 250-lb. bombs was sent with instructions to order the tanker to steer in the required direction, failing which she was to be attacked.

8. The Striking Force arrived on the scene at 1500 and found the situation as already described, the ship surrendering and no attempt being made to abandon her.

It is interesting to note that although there was a number of naval personnel on board the ship and that scuttling charges were in place, no further steps were taken to scuttle her even after H.M.S. "DUNEDIN" had appeared. This was presumably due to the presence overhead of the air Striking Force and to the bombing by aircraft 5B.

This may be the first occasion on which a ship has surrendered to aircraft.

9. The Striking Force remained in the vicinity until the arrival of H.M.S. "DUNEDIN" at 1745, when an A/S patrol was organised, and at 1820 owing to shortage of petrol they returned to the Carrier.

H.M.S. "EAGLE" eventually joined H.M.S. "DUNEDIN" and the tanker at 2040 maintaining an A/S patrol until sunset.

10. It was at once evident that the Commanding Officer, H.M.S. "DUNEDIN", Captain R.S. Lovatt, Royal Navy, had the situation most effectively in hand. The ship's engines and steering were reported to be intact and subject to my approval he proposed to send the ship under his prize crew to BERMUDA. I concurred.

11. The Prize was got under way at 2350 on a course for Bermuda and at 0150 16th June the Commanding Officer, H.M.S. "DUNEDIN" reported being satisfied that she was proceeding satisfactorily. Force "F" thereupon left her and turned to the Eastward, and the circumstances were reported to you by signal 0228/16.

ADM 199/809 200

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE.

Page 3 of "EAGLE"s No. L.0949 of 16 June, 1941).

SECRET.

13. I have the honour to bring to your notice the evident high state of efficiency existing in H.M.S. "DUNEDIN"s organisation for boarding, quick survey, anti-scuttling measures and prize crew arrangements.

Despite the facts that this prize had been hit by 2 bombs, and that 6 time fused scuttling charges had been placed, she was ready for steaming by H.M.S. "DUNEDIN"s prize crew within about six hours of making contact.

13. I also invite your attention for the second time (vide paragraph 9 of my No.E.0946 dated 9th June, 1941 - not to H.M.S. "DUNEDIN") to excellent work performed by the crew of aircraft 5B:-

- Mr William L. Hughes, Temporary Midshipman (A) RNVR - Pilot.
- Temporary Sub Lieutenant (A) Philip A. Denington, RNVR - Observer.
- Norman C. Wills, Leading Airman, (AG.3), late D/JX.145033 - Air Gunner.

On this occasion they were the first to sight and report the enemy and the accuracy of their bombing was most certainly the cause of her surrender.

14. The fact that the crew of the enemy vessel were unable to scuttle and abandon their ship was due to the accuracy of the machine gun fire on the boats carried out by the crew of aircraft 5K:-

- Sub Lieutenant(A) Charles R. CAMIDGE, R.N. - Pilot.
- Temporary Acting Sub Lieutenant(A) William H. LETT, R.N.V.R. - Observer.
- Frank A. DEAN, Leading Airman(Ty), (A.G.3), P/FX.79420 - Rear Gunner.

15. Attached as Appendix I are some photographs of the "DUNEDIN"s.S.S. "LOTHRINGEN", and as Appendix II a track chart of H.M.S. "EAGLE"s movements and aircraft searches.

I have the honour to be,


Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

(E.G.N. RUSHBROOKE).
CAPTAIN,
Royal Navy.



Appendices

ADM 199/809 


PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE.

One Document, being 'Track chart showing movements
of surface and air units involved in capture
of German tanker "Lotningen"'

has been removed to MPI 491 (2)

9.8.1978

Margaret Brennand



MOST SECRET

Appendix I to "Eagle's"
O.E. 0949 dated 16 June, 1941.

(2 Sets of ⁵/₁₀ photographs)

(1 Set retained by (CINCSA))

ALWAYS PLACE NEGATIVE WITH GLASS SIDE
AGAINST FRONT OF ENVELOPE SO THAT FINGERS
WILL TOUCH GLASS SIDE WHEN WITHDRAWING





10114 2/40 1,500 pads JCS Ltd Gp074/85

MESSAGE.

Report on 1st



10014 2140 1,500 pads JCS Ltd GP074/35

MESSAGE.

Report on 201

MOST SECRET



2/40 1,500 Pads JC&SLtd Gp074/95

MESSAGE.

Report on det

2/18

AS KRISTIAN

THE PHOTOGRAPHIC OFFICE
MOST SECRET



MESSAGE.

10214 2/40 1,500 pads JCSLtd Gp074/35

FROM: WHOM

Route S.A.

779/020

ARRIVINGS TO BOARD.

SUBJECT.

~~556~~ } for
Asst. ~~27/18~~ } information

Remains ERBE dispa
as KRISTINA FT

Report on 28/1/51

MOST SECRET

THE PHOTOGRAPHIC OFFICE



1014 2/40 1,500 pads JCS Lia GP074/85

MESSAGE.

55L } for
Asst Dir } information
27/8 }
Report on activity
in "KRISTINA" for
summary ERG sign

MARKINGS TO BOARD.

SUBJECT.

7/19/020

Code S.H



Sumner's ELBE disguised

SR KRISTIANIA FJORD

information
27/8

MESSAGE.

IC&SLtd Gp074/85

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

To Commander in Chief, South Atlantic

DATE 11.8.41

SENT

NAVAL CODE (X)

From Admiralty

Your 786/020 of 21st June, 1941. The King has made the following Appointment and Awards:-

O.B.E. (Military)

Captain R. N. Lovatt, R.N. H.M.S. DUNEDIN

Mention in Despatches

Lt. Cdr. R.N.H. Bowden, R.N. DUNEDIN

Sub-Lt. (A) C.R. Camidge, R.N. EAGLE

Ty: Sub. Lt (A) P.A. Denington, R.N.V.R. EAGLE

Tel: P. F. Jackson, P/J 102244, DUNEDIN.

1101A/12

For R. Gleadowe
(C.W. (H & A))

Naval Secretary
N.A.2 S.L. (2)
C.W. (H & A)
Admiral Willis
N
A.C.R.